Bugs Reporting

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information correction
Dear De.Fi Team, I am writing to formally request a manual review of the automated scanner results for the BTCLE token on the BNB Smart Chain. Currently, the scanner is flagging the project for "High Risk" issues (ETH Draining and Fake Token Approval) which we believe are false positives. Project Details: • Token Name: BTCLE • Network: BNB Smart Chain (BSC) • Contract Address: 0x9d2144328e1d618f54cd38540f5ee50671f6a208 Our Evidence & Replies to Flags: High-Risk Draining & Approval Flags (False Positives) Our contract is standard ERC-20 compliant. We have been cleared by other major security providers: • CertiK Skynet: 100% clean scan. [ https://skynet.certik.com/tools/token-scan/bsc/0x9d2144328e1d618f54cd38540f5ee50671f6a208 ] • GoPlus Security: No malicious logic or honeypot detected. [ https://console.gopluslabs.io/token-security/56/0x9d2144328e1d618f54cd38540f5ee50671f6a208 ] • Code Review: The contract code is verified on BSCScan and contains no hidden delegatecall or malicious approve logic.[ https://bscscan.com/token/0x9d2144328e1d618f54cd38540f5ee50671f6a208#code ] Rugpull Risk & Liquidity (92.4% Locked) Contrary to the "Unlocked Liquidity" flag, the vast majority of our supply is locked via UNCX (UniCrypt): • Locked Percentage: 92.4054% • Vesting Timeline: 10 Years • Release Logic: Each of the multiple wallets is programmed to unlock less than 1% at a time to prevent market impact. • Proof of Lock: [ https://app.uncx.network/vesting-v2/token/chain/1/address/0x9d2144328e1d618f54cd38540f5ee50671f6a208?view=vesting ] Wallet Concentration (Transparency) The concentration noted by the scanner represents our long-term strategic reserve, which is fully vested and locked as shown above. These are not liquid "dump" wallets but rather secured ecosystem reserves. Contract Activity: We have noted the "30-day inactivity" alert. Please be advised that the project is fully active; the lack of contract interaction is due to the stability and finality of our code, which requires no administrative "backdoor" changes. Trading volume is consistent and healthy. Requested Action: We ask that you perform a final manual audit of these links and update the BTCLE safety profile to "Low Risk" or "Verified" to match our external audit results from CertiK. Thank you for your assistance in providing a transparent and safe environment for DeFi investors. Please feel free to contact me if you have any inquiries.
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MarsLibertyCoin (MarsLC) — please correct false positives in report
Hello, Could you please run the manual review for our token and correct the following items in your report? Website: https://marslibertycoin.com/ 1) Mint function — restricted, not a risk Your panel marks the token as “mintable”. Technically true, but please note the hard restrictions encoded: Minting is strictly limited and may be called only under a narrow condition tied to circulating supply (when circulating supply falls to a defined low-threshold). When allowed: minting can execute only if the freely-traded float on markets falls to ≤10% of total supply. Otherwise the tx reverts. How the amount is computed: the contract must consider both (a) the USDT reserves accumulated in our WhiteBox, and (b) the current market price (reference DEX price). i.e., we cannot mint more tokens than our reserves can immediately support, and never above 1,000,000 tokens per event. no EOAs, no arbitrary withdrawals. No admin minting: there is no unlimited/owner mint; all limits are hard-coded. Important for circulating-supply math: the 3,000,000 MARSLC treasury/creator tokens are not circulating. They are locked with a 36-month cliff, then vest 100,000/month, and only if the price ≥ $10 at the time of vest. Please exclude these from circulating supply in your report Please adjust the “Mintable” risk to reflect this constrained design. 2) “External call risk” — expected internal calls only Your panel flags potential external calls. In our case they are only to our two internal, immutable helper contracts: FeeCollector — swaps collected fees and immediately forwards; • does not custody user funds; • no arbitrary withdrawals to EOAs; • purpose-limited to conversion/forwarding. WhiteBox — liquidity support only (five public helper functions); • no function to withdraw to arbitrary addresses; • interacts with the DEX router/pair strictly for liquidity operations. All three contracts (Token / FeeCollector / WhiteBox) are verified and immutable (no upgrade hooks). These calls are part of the tokenomics workflow and do not create an exploitation surface beyond normal DEX interactions. Please downgrade/remove the generic “external call” risk. 3)Wallet-to-Wallet Transfers Fee The wallet-to-wallet fee is not a penalty or hidden tax — it’s part of our reserve-building model. When tokens move between wallets, the fee is automatically converted to USDT and split: The larger portion goes directly to the Reserve Vault (Whitebox) — strengthening the token’s hard-backed reserves. The smaller portion goes to the marketing wallet to support growth and visibility. Every transfer helps increase the protocol’s USDT holdings, reinforcing stability and transparency over time Absent abilities: no pause/stop trading, no blacklist/whitelist, no arbitrary transfers, no upgrade/proxy, no emergency withdraw/sweep, no retargeting of module addresses, no generic delegatecall.
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